The security record
Which agents exist, what they can reach, what they did, how risky it was.
Owned by security
Either security says no, and becomes the thing standing in the way
of the strategy, or the business moves ahead anyway, and the agent
estate expands unmanaged.
But there’s a third way.
01
Most teams cannot compile a complete, current list of what agents are deployed, where they operate and who owns them, so posture, compliance and control decisions are all made on incomplete data.
327% more agents than one customer’s own security team estimated
02
Not every agent produces logs, and those that do often allow the session to be rewritten. Without behavioral context, a risky session reads like routine work.
03
Endpoint-only sensors stop at the device, and gateways see only the traffic that crosses them. Neither can govern a system that lives everywhere at once.
04
Developer agents wasting tokens on side projects. Agents that keep running long after they should have stopped. Three departments paying separately for the same work. It comes up in every other first meeting, and often before security does.
Every organization we have deployed into found more agents than it expected, in one case 327% more. The gap between the inventory and the estate is where risk, spend and accountability all go missing at once.
In the register reviewed, owned, approved
Running anyway shadow, citizen-built, developer preference, duplicated across departments
Unapproved customer-facing agents processing sensitive complaints. Developer agents running side projects on company tokens. A marketing agent built by someone who never knew a review process existed. None of it appears in the register, and none of it stops running while the register is being written.
Without behavioral context, all three rows are the same row.
Many agents leave no log at all, either because the platform they run on doesn’t produce one or because the security team has no access to it, and where a log does exist, the session can often be edited or rewritten after the fact.
Even a complete log only records what happened, one event at a time. It shows that a coding agent read a repository, used a credential and pushed a commit, but not the full picture. Understanding intent means reading the agent itself: its objective, its context and the sequence of what it did.
| Tool | Cloud | Code | Endpoint | Browser |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total agent coverage | covered | covered | covered | covered |
| Endpoint sensor | not covered | not covered | covered | not covered |
| MCP gateway | covered | not covered | not covered | not covered |
| Cloud posture tool | covered | not covered | not covered | not covered |
| Identity platform | permissions only, not activity | permissions only, not activity | permissions only, not activity | permissions only, not activity |
| Cost dashboard | not covered | not covered | not covered | not covered |
The problem is that the agent is a single system and each tool is looking at one wall of it. Assembling five partial answers by hand, weekly, gives you a history of the estate rather than a working view of it.
Agentic spend is now a board-level line item. Wasteful spend can come in many forms: side projects, looping agents, duplicate work, and liberal model choice. Security, AI operations and finance teams need a shared view of not just what agents cost, but what work that spend is actually buying.
What you get today
API and model usage $418,900
One aggregate, with no agent, owner or task attached, and no answer to “was any of that worth it?”
What the question actually needs
| Agent | Work it was doing | Owner | Spend |
|---|---|---|---|
| claims-triage | Claims intake | Claims ops | $96,400 |
| market-research | Competitor research | Strategy | $61,200 |
| pr-review-agent | Retrying a failed job, 3,400 times | Platform eng | $73,800 |
| unnamed-dev-agent | Personal side project | Unattributed | $44,100 |
| 3 × content-drafter | The same task, three departments | Marketing, Sales, CS | $143,400 |
Three of these five rows are waste, and none of them are visible until spend is attached to behavior.
The security record
Which agents exist, what they can reach, what they did, how risky it was.
Owned by security
The financial record
How many tokens, on which model, in which month, at what total.
Owned by finance or IT
The activity record
What business outcome the agent achieved.
Owned by the business department
Often treated as three separate records, but the same agent activity underlies all three of them.
Critical Supply chain
It looked legitimate until somebody understood what the agent was doing with it. Skills sit in the agent’s own configuration and generate no outbound traffic for a gateway to intercept.
High Data exposure
Customer-facing, never reviewed, handling exactly the material a review would have caught. It was not in any inventory.
Critical IP leakage
In the commit history it reads as routine work. The distinction only exists if you can see what the agent was holding at the time.
Medium Propagation
Agent-to-agent spread through the same mechanisms that make agents useful. Nothing in the traditional stack is watching that path.
High Insider threat
An employee ran an unsanctioned agent with credentials linked to a rival, exposing customer data and company IP. Endpoint and network controls saw normal development.
Medium Financial risk
Spend runs without an owner, attribution or a cap. On the invoice it looks like a usage spike, and it only reads as a security problem once you can see whose credentials paid for it.
33%
of enterprise software applications will include agentic AI by 2028
Gartner
15%
of day-to-day operations completed autonomously by 2028
Gartner
40%
of agentic AI projects will face cancellation due to unmanaged risks
Gartner
12
months in which every major platform shipped agent capability
Anthropic, Microsoft, OpenAI, GitHub, AWS
Solving agentic security starts with an understanding from inside the agent’s own execution path, not from a boundary near it. From there, a security team can approve more agents, with evidence behind every decision.